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THE POVERTY OF AMERICAN
ENERGY POLICY
Patrick H. Martin*
Three years have now passed since the Arab oil embargo of 1973.
More than any other single event, the embargo made Americans aware
of a crisis facing their high energy demand economy. Despite the
passage of dozens of acts by Congress, hundreds of conferences on
energy, thousands of books and articles on energy problems, and
numerous public hearings by congressional, administrative, and state
committees and agencies, the United States is in a worse energy posi-
tion today than at the time of the 1973 embargo. The nation is now
importing more oil than ever before, and more of it is coming from
sources of doubtful reliability than ever before.' Policy planning has
been primarily of a short-term nature and has been characterized by
expediency and cynicism. Different federal agencies have been work-
ing at cross-purposes to one another, the Congress has been unable to
choose among competing policy options, states seeking to maximize
their own benefits have hampered federal policies, and industries have
fought with one another to be the beneficiaries of government actions,
all to the detriment of the public. The cause of this has not so much
been a failure to arrive at an American Energy Policy, but a failure to
agree upon the basic premises from which governmental policies must
flow. The poverty of American energy policy is the failure to find
these principles and have them serve as a guide to the establishment
and implementation of particular energy policies.
Before considering energy policy, it is necessary to ask what is the
goal that is to be achieved by the energy policy. Stated in simplest
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; Ph.D.,
Louisiana State University; J.D., Duke University.
1. Total oil imports were approaching nearly one-half of all consumption in the
first half of 1976. See 74 Ou., & GAS L, July 26, 1976, at 103-10. About 30% of
current imports come from countries that participated in the 1973-1974 embargo. Only
18% was imported from these same countries at the start of the embargo. Id., Octo.
ber 18, 1976, at 30.
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terms, that goal is to obtain assured supplies of energy in quantities ade-
quate to meet the demands of an advanced industrial society with a high
standard of living while minimizing adverse impacts on the environment
from energy development. The United States, indeed the world, is
now in the midst of a profound shift in its energy resource base. The
energy policy problem is one of how best to facilitate this shift. For
the past half century or so the United States has relied primarily upon
petroleum as a source of energy because of its low price, ease of
handling, and suitability for the internal combustion engine.2 Profound
economic change took place when petroleum supplanted coal as the
principal source of power, just as drastic economic change occurred
when coal became the fuel of the industrial age in place of firewood and
water power.3 Petroleum is no longer cheap and assured supplies are
limited: the Petroleum Age is nearly over. The country must wean
itself from petroleum and look to other sources of supply. Until a new
primary source proves itself technically and economically feasible, the
United States will have to rely upon an increasingly diverse mixture of
power sources. The task for policy makers is to accommodate the
changes that necessarily must occur as the nation undergoes the shift
in its energy base while still meeting the goal of the energy policy.
The discussion which follows is an effort to establish several basic
principles which are believed, based upon the experience of current
energy regulation, to be necessary as a guide to future action if the
country is to have a viable energy policy. It is based upon certain
assumptions or conclusions that should be stated explicitly before pro-
ceeding further. First, there is no evidence to support the assertion
that effective competition is lacking in the energy industry.4 Policy
proposals for breaking up the energy industries or for taking punitive
actions against them would not, if implemented, result in greater
energy production or lower prices for consumers. Second, although
importation of oil will have to continue for many years to come, it is
undesirable for the United States to rely upon foreign sources for more
than 20% of its total energy supplies. Heavy reliance on foreign oil
places the United States in a weak military, economic, and foreign
2. E. ZnImRMANN, WORLD RESoURCES AN INDusmIES 495 (rev. ed. 1951).
3. R. RoBmNsoN, ISTORY OF Tim AMmuCA ECONOMY 183-202, 344-45 (2d ed.
1964).
4. See [1976] EN. USERS REp. (BNA), No. 151, at A-7 to A-10 (summary of
an analysis by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company); Kinney, Divestiture, 74 OIL & GAS
J., May 10, 1976, at 55-61. See also NATIONAL ENIERGY PROJECT VERTICAL INTEGRA-
TION IN THE OIL ImusmY (E. Mitchell ed. 1976).
[Vol. 12:65
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policy position because the energy supply is not dependable.5 It also
causes an outflow of dollars contributing to an unfavorable balance of
trade.6 Third, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) will not break up or its member states lose the ability to con-
trol the price of world market crude oil in the foreseeable future.7 Ab-
sent a catastrophic world event, the price of foreign crude oil will not
go down and is likely to increase. Fourth, while conservation of exist-
ing energy sources is desirable and, indeed, necessary, it does not lead
to energy production. Producing petroleum reservoirs and coal fields
have a life span of relatively few years, and new reservoirs and fields
must be constantly brought into production just to maintain total pro-
duction at current levels."
Acceptance of these assumptions or conclusions rules out placing
much reliance on several of the policy models that have been proposed
for the United States to follow. Professor Howard R. Williams of Stan-
ford University has recently described six energy policy models that
have been advocated by influential individuals or groups for the United
States in dealing with its current energy problems.9 Briefly sunmar-
ized, these are: a) A "Conservation" model, the essential feature of
which is that adequate conservation of energy use will in large part
solve the American energy problem; b) A "Consumer Protection"
model, enjoying much support, which would continue strong controls
on natural gas and oil prices; c) A "Break-Up OPEC" model, which
is based on the belief that steps can be taken to lessen the market-
power of OPEC and thereby reduce the price of petroleum on the
world market; d) A 'reak-Up the Oil Companies" model with exten-
5. Secretary of Commerce, Elliott Richardson, has declared that "[tihe next em-
bargo could be catastrophic," 74 OIL & GAS J., October 18, 1976, at 30. Another em-
bargo, he estimated, could cost the United States 4.8 million jobs and $170 billion a
year in gross national product. Id.
6. Secretary of the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe, noted recently that the cost of
oil imports has jumped from $3 billion in 1970 to around $35 billion in 1976. Putting
it another way, he observed that in 1970 we paid $15 per person for imported oil. This
year we are paying the foreign oil producers more than $160 for every man, woman
and child in America. Department of the Interior Press Release (September 21, 1976).
7. Indeed, prices have been increased recently by OPEC, Wall St. J., July 1, 1976,
at 4, col. 1, and many observers expect them to be raised again in the near future.
[1976] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 165, at A-28.
8. Despite greatly increased drilling activity, domestic production is declining
3%-4% per year. From a 1970 peak of a daily average of 9,637,000 barrels per day,
production has dropped to an average of 8,085,000 barrels per day. 74 On. & GAs
J., July 26, 1976, at 103.
9. H. Williams, Oil and Gas and the Federal Lands (Aug. 23, 1976) (paper pre-
sented to the Conference on Energy and the Public Lands, Park City, Utah, a copy
of which was provided the author by Professor Williams) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
1976]
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sive public appeal that would attempt to lower energy prices by vertical
and/or horizontal divestiture of the holdings of major energy com-
panies; e) A "Federal Oil and Gas Company" model which would
involve establishing a federal corporation to develop the oil and gas
resources of the public lands and the outer continental shelf and to
engage in other activities now fulfilled by private companies; f) A
"Free Market" model which would balance supply and demand of
energy resources by removal of many or most of the government con-
trols on energy. In addition, there is "Project Independence," the goal
of which is to stimulate additional energy production to decrease
reliance on foreign energy sources.10
Each of these has found support in Congress, and each has had
some influence on recent legislation and/or administrative agency rule
making." However, as the preceding statements would suggest,
several of these models hold no hope for increasing energy supplies or
lowering prices, for example, the "Break-Up the Oil Companies" model
and the "Break-Up OPEC" model. Some aspects of the other models
are inconsistent with one another and tend to be counterproductive.
Thus price controls enacted pursuant to the "Consumer Protection"
model do insulate the consumer from the full effects of foreign crude
oil price increases, but they do not promote conservation of petroleum
products, and they discourage development of additional petroleum
resources and alternative fuels.
The inadequacy of present energy policies is explained by the
inconsistent goals sought to be achieved by Congress and the lack of
consensus on basic principles that should be followed. Professor
Williams suggests that the 'Free Market" model should be given a
greater opportunity to prove itself as an efficient means of achieving
a sound energy policy.' 2 The author is in agreement with Professor
Williams that the "Free Market" model should be pursued further.'
However, it must be acknowledged that the model has certain short-
10. Examples of each of these models are to be found in H. WLLIAMS, R. MA X7_1
WELL & C. MEYERS, CASES ON OIL AND GAS 13-106 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WILLIAMS, MAXWELL & MEYERS].
11. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp. "V
1975); Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125
(1976) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.). Each act contains provi.
sions based on the same principles as the models described.
12. See Williams, note 9 supra.
13. Professor Williams does not fully articulate his concept of the "Free Market"
model. The description of the "Free Market" model which follows is not necessarily
the same as Professor Williams' model.
[Vol. 12:65
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comings. For present purposes, the most important of these is that the
market system often does not reflect all of the true costs of the produc-
tion of the item or commodity in question.' 4 Economists refer to this
as the problem of externalities. Thus, water or air pollution or other
environmental degradation is a cost of many types of energy develop-
ment which, without governmental intervention, is not reflected in the
cost of the energy to the consumer. As a result, there are many who
feel that various types of governmental activity are necessary to "inter-
nalize" the costs of pollution or to limit or prohibit certain types of con-
duct involved in energy production.' Governmentally imposed costs
or limitations on energy development often will hinder that develop-
ment. Compromise on environmental protection and other social
values will be necessary. Such compromise entails two problems,
First, by what standards should environmental limitations on energy
development be measured? Second, who should have the authority to
make these limitations: federal, state or local government? In dis-
cussing the rationale of the "Free Market" model and answering these
questions, the author will attempt to establish several basic principles
upon which a sound American energy policy may be based. The focus
will be upon several areas of primary concern: control of price and
allocation of supplies of energy, protection of the environment and fed-
eral-state relations in energy policy.
I. A MARKET SYSTEM OF P~iciNG AND ALLOCATION IS
PREFERABLE TO GOVERNMENTAL PRICING AND ALLOCATION
Determination of the price of energy is one of the most important
aspects of current federal policies on petroleum. The wellhead price
of natural gas in interstate commerce has been controlled by the Fed-
eral Power Commission since the 1954 Supreme Court decision of
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin.'6 Price controls on crude oil and
refined products are of more recent date. They were first imposed in
1971 as part of general price controls throughout the economy. How-
ever, when controls were lifted on other goods they were reimposed
on oil and this price control authority has been continued under the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended.' 7
14. A collection of essays which take up the problem of externalities in reference
to the environment is POLLUTION, REsouRcEs AND THE ENVIRONMENT (A. Enthoven
& A. Freeman eds. 1973).
15. See text accompanying notes 95-97.
16. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (Supp. V 1975). See articles cited at note 52 infra
for the background and operation of the controls.
1976]
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The necessity of allocating supplies of energy arises as a natural
and inevitable consequence of controlling the price of energy. If there
were no price controls, there would be no problem of allocation, for one
of the primary functions of price is to allocate scarcity to those who are
most willing to pay for the short supplies. Thus the topics of price
control and allocation can and should be treated together.
The Function of Price
Price serves several functions at once in a market system.1 8 At
a minimum, the price of an item should be high enough to compensate
a seller for all of the costs which he has incurred in acquiring or produc-
ing the item. 9 The price paid for an item then serves a compensatory
function, returning to the seller all, or some, of the costs he has had
to bear. The seller will always try to sell at this price at the very least.
Price serves also as an important mechanism for signaling the seller,
other sellers, and potential sellers. If the seller is unable to sell at the
level he calculates is necessary to recoup his costs, it is a signal to him
to produce less, to lower his costs by becoming more efficient or by
finding cheaper supply sources, or to retreat from the market entirely.
Others observing the experience of this seller know not to enter the
market or to reduce their output as well, unless they, for some reason,
do not have to bear the same costs as the seller. If the seller is able
to sell all of his output at a level higher than is necessary to recoup
his costs, it is a signal to him to increase his output. For other sellers
and potential sellers, the ability of the seller to sell his product at a
price greater than his costs is a signal for them likewise to increase their
output or to enter the market, for there is an unsatisfied demand among
buyers that they can satisfy. They will produce increased amounts of
the same item as the first seller or a substitute for the same item so
long as they can recoup their costs, even if they will not enjoy the same
profit level as the first seller.
The preceding will serve to introduce the first problems that are
posed by price controls. If the price set by the government is below
the amount necessary to compensate the seller for all of his costs (again
18. C. FERGusoN & S. MAURICE, ECONoMcC ANALYSIS 56-57 (rev. ed. 1974); R.
LEFrwic & A. SHA"P, EcoNoMcs OF SociA. IssuEs ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1976); R. LEFT-
wicH, TnE PRUCE SYSTEM AND REsoURCE ALLOCATION 59-64 (5th ed. 1973); P. LINDERT,
PRICES, JOBS, AND GROWTH ch. 13 (1976); P. SAMuErLON, ECONOMICS 398-400 (10th
ed. 1976).
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including a reasonable return for labor and investment), then the seller
will decrease his production or cease it entirely. If the price is set at
a level just sufficient to compensate the seller, the price will not serve
as a signal for others to enter into the market or to increase their out-
put of the same or similar items. Those who could produce the same
item or a substitute at a higher cost than the first seller will not do so
because they would not be compensated for the costs they incurred.
Thus new, higher-cost production is discouraged by the price controls.
Price serves as an important signal to buyers as well as to sellers.
When buyers learn of a price increase (whether it is caused by
increased costs or by increased demands and higher profits to sellers)
they know that if they are unwilling or are unable to pay the full price
increase they must become more efficient and use less of the item, or
they must switch to substitutes for the item, or both. Buyers who have
a great need for the item will be more willing to pay a higher price
than those who do not have a great need for it. As the price increases,
buyers who can rely on less will do so, thereby conserving the item,'
and those who can switch to substitutes will switch. Price, then, will
allocate supplies of the item to those who cannot conserve and who can-
not switch to a substitute item. It may be objected that price will allo-
cate to those with the money to pay the higher price and not necessarily
to those with the greatest need. Suffice it to say at this point that
among those with money price will serve this allocative function, and
if those without the necessary funds are deemed by society to have a
superior claim to the item, it would be preferable to give a subsidy to
those without the funds to enable them to make the necessary
purchase.2 0
Price controls pose problems because of their effects among
buyers of the controlled items as well as their effects among sellers.
By limiting the price, the government reduces the incentive to conserve
the item, and thus wasteful use of the item may be continued. Those
who can switch to a substitute will not switch so long as the price of
the substitute is greater than the price of the controlled item and the
buyer is able to purchase the controlled item. With prices controlled
by a governmental body, price is unable to perform its allocative func-
tion of determining which buyers feel that their use of the item is the
20. One of the problems of price controls is that they hold down the price to the
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most essential use. If price is not allowed to allocate, another method
of allocation must be employed.
Allocation
When demand exceeds supply of an item and price is not allowed
to allocate among those who demand the item, that is, the price is con-
trolled at a point below its market-clearing level, then another system
of allocation must replace the price system of allocation.21 If the item
is not awarded to the highest bidder then it must be awarded to some-
one else on some other basis than willingness to pay for the item. Thus
when the government determines that it will control the price of an
item, it will generally also have to determine who will be allowed to
purchase the item at the controlled price. As previously indicated,
rational and efficient use of an item tends to predominate when price
is the method of allocation. Other values may become predominant
when another method of allocation is used. For example, if the agency
chosen to make the allocation is inclined toward protection of the
environment, it may allow purchases of the controlled item only by
those persons who will use the item in a manner least likely to harm
the environment. The agency's decision then constitutes, in effect, a
subsidy to the environment, and that subsidy is hidden in the price
controls. If the agency is dependent upon political favor for its con-
tinued existence, then it may choose to sell the controlled item only
to those most likely to be able to assist the agency in gaining politi-
cal favor. In effect, the agency's decision is a subsidy to those with
the greatest political. support. Buyers who must purchase substitutes
at higher prices because they were not favored by the agency are placed
at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those who are favored by the
agency.
In other words, the agency which determines the method of alloca-
tion is capable of putting a number of values other than rational and
efficient use of the item into the system of allocation. Such values may
never be expressly articulated and may not reflect the optimum use of
the item. Those who are allowed to purchase at the controlled price
are given a subsidy. Those who are not allowed to purchase at the
controlled price must do without, or find a substitute at a higher price
or one which is much less satisfactory than the unavailable item. This
places the persons who do not receive the subsidy at a competitive dis-
21. See note 18 supra.
[Vol. 12:65
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advantage to those who are given the subsidy by the allocation of the
item to them.
In addition to the problems of hidden subsidies in governmental
allocations, there is also the problem that the allocations may fail to
identify the persons who are capable of conserving or using a substitute
good or doing without the controlled item. That is to say, the adminis-
tering agency may allocate the item to persons who are capable of using
a substitute item and may refuse to allocate the item to another person
who needs the item and cannot possibly use a substitute. To give an
example, let us say that A and B both want gasoline so that they can
drive to work. A lives in the city on a bus line while B lives in the
country and has no means of transportation other than his car. If price
is used to allocate gasoline between A and B, B would under almost
any circumstances be willing to pay more for the gasoline than A, for
A has the alternative of riding the bus to work. If the price of gasoline
is controlled at a low level, B would have no opportunity to outbid A
for that gasoline. The government controlling the price would then
allocate between A and B in some fashion. There might be a lottery,
and if A's name were pulled, then A would not ride the bus even
though he has this alternative. B who has no alternative will not get
the gasoline. Or again, the agency might decide to give both A and
B an equal amount of the gasoline at the controlled price. This too
results in a misallocation, for A will now drive to work when it might
be preferable that he ride the bus and B may not be allocated enough
to carry him to work. Of course the government agency could allocate
the controlled gasoline to B and could force A to ride the bus, but this
would require a vast bureaucracy to ascertain the relative needs of peo-
ple, and it would necessarily involve a dramatic intrusion into people's
lives and deprive them of an element of their personal freedom. A
complex system of allocation may require massive expenses to the pub-
lic, and it would be subject to abuses by those administering it.
Current Price Control and Allocation of Natural Gas
Natural gas has been subject to control by the Federal Power
Commission since the passage of the Natural Gas Act in 1938.22 The
purpose of this Act was primarily to regulate interstate gas pipelines
which were thought to be subject to monopolistic control.23 It was not
22. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1970).
23. Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power
Commission, 11 J. LAw & ECON. 243, 254 (1968).
1976]
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until 1954 that the FPC began to regulate the wellhead price of natural
gas in interstate commerce for all producers, when the Supreme Court,
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, held that the FPC was man-
dated by the Natural Gas Act to do so. 24 In the Phillips decision the
FPC was thus given the task of regulating the wellhead price for natural
gas produced by thousands of companies.
As Edmund Kitch has commented, the "imposition of price control
on the field market for natural gas represents an important departure
for American economic regulation; price control has never before been
administered by a permanent, federal regulatory agency."2  The
Commission was not prepared for the task given it. For several years
it attempted to deal with the problem on a company by company, cost-
of-service basis. This was not administratively feasible, so the FPC
announced in 1960 that in the future it would determine pricing for
natural gas on an area by area basis.2 It instituted a provisional two-
tier pricing system while it proceeded in setting area rates. In 1965
the Commission issued its first decision for an area rate and subse-
quently, the Supreme Court fully supported the Commission's rate
making process. 27  Essentially this was a modified cost-of-service
method, using average costs in a producing area and employing two
price levels or tiers.
In the tiered pricing approach, flowing or "old" gas under contract
has been limited to a lower price than "new" gas which is yet to be
produced or has not been dedicated to interstate commerce. The
reason for using this approach is to encourage development of new gas
fields and dedication of the gas to the interstate market. 28  Both the
lower and upper prices have been determined by costs to the producers,
but the costs for new gas production have been higher. By not averag-
ing the costs for the new production with the costs for currently flowing
gas, one is able to give an incentive for new production and avoid a
so-called windfall to producers of "old" gas.29 An upper tier may later
become an intermediate tier as the price for new gas must again be
24. 347 U.S. 682-83 (1953).
25. Kitch, supra note 23, at 243.
26. See generally WmLIAms, MAXWELL, & MEYEns, supra note 10, at 77-91; Breyer
& MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers,
86 H v. L. Rnv. 941, 958 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Breyer & MacAvoy].
27. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). Other rates were set
for other areas by the Federal Power Commission. Southern La. Area Rate Cases v.
FPC, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
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raised to reflect increased costs and to give additional incentive for
exploration and development. As will be discussed below, the tiered
pricing system has also been employed in regulating the price of crude
oil.
Area rate making proved difficult for the FPC, and in 1974 the
Commission moved to establish a uniform national rate-base. With
Opinion No. 699 the FPC established a maximum rate of forty-two
cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of natural gas.3" This rate was
to be applicable to all gas produced from wells commenced on or after
January 1, 1973 or dedicated to interstate commerce after that date.
Existing rates for flowing gas set under the area-rate method were not
changed. More recently, in Opinion No. 770, the Commission has
established a uniform national rate for "new" gas of $1.42 per Mcf for
the 1975-1976 biennium with a one cent per quarter escalator clause
being permitted. 31 For "new" gas for the 1973-1974 biennium a rate
of $1.01 per Mcf was permitted by the initial opinion.32 However, on
November 5, 1976 the Commission issued Opinion No. 770-A, modify-
ing No. 770. The rate for 1973-1974 gas was reduced to $.93 per
Mcf, and the definition of "new" gas was modified to include only gas
from wells commenced on or after the first day of the 1973-1974 or
the 1975-1976 biennium. Gas from wells commenced prior to these
dates but dedicated to interstate commerce for the first time during
either biennium will not be eligible for the rates of Opinion No. 770,
so the incentive for a producer to shift from the intrastate market to
interstate market was removed.33 Again, other existing rates were not
altered, so gas sold in interstate commerce is now being sold at widely
varying rates.
Opinion No. 770, as modified, is the latest response by the FPC
to a crisis in natural gas that has been developing for years. The crisis
is directly attributable to the price controls on natural gas sold in inter-
state commerce. To begin with, natural gas is a nearly perfect fuel:
it is virtually nonpolluting, easy to control (close regulation of tempera-
ture is possible) and requires no storage facilities for the purchaser.
People would be willing to pay more for natural gas than for alternative
fuels in order to get the qualities that gas possesses. However, the FPC
has held the price of natural gas below the price of substitute fuels;
30. 18 C.F.R. § 2.56a (1976).
31. 41 Fed. Reg. 33,364 (1976).
32. Id.
33. 41 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (1976).
1976]
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the price has not reflected the commodity value of the gas. As a result,
energy consumers would, other things being equal, prefer natural gas
to fuel'oil or coal. The use of substitute fuels has thus been discour-
aged by the price controls on gas. Demand has been high, and gas
has been used faster than producers have been able to add new
reserves to meet future needs.84 It is open to question whether the
price of new gas has in the past been set high enough to encourage
new production. A "reasonable" rate of return on investment has been
built into the price setting methodology, but it is doubtful that the costs
used in rate setting have adequately anticipated future costs to pro-
ducers. In making new investments it is future and not historic costs
to which the producer must look. 5 Also, it is reasonable to assume
that the great uncertainty which has existed about future regulatory
policy has discouraged new development of gas.
Further complicating this already complex situation has been the
fact that intrastate sales of natural gas have not been subject to regula-
tion by the Commission. Natural gas prices in the intrastate market
have been able to rise to reflect the economic value of the gas.8" Pro-
ducers who have been faced with a choice of entering into the inter-
state or the intrastate market have quite naturally preferred to sell the
gas they have produced in the intrastate market at a higher price.
They have probably been under a legal duty to their lessors to obtain
the highest possible price for the gas so as to give the highest royalties
possible to the lessors.82 As more gas has been dedicated to the intra-
state market, less gas has been available for dedication to the interstate
market, and the shortage has been exacerbated."8
Faced with a growing shortage of natural gas in interstate
commerce, the FPC has had to determine who would receive the scarce
supplies of gas that have been available. The Commission, as an out-
34. Moody, 1974-The Gathering Storm, 26th Oxr & GAS INs=. 1, 36 (Matthew
Bender 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moody].
35. See Brown, Introduction, to REGULATioN OF TnE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING IN-
DUSTRY 1, 8 (K. Brown ed. 1972). For a suggestion that Federal Power Commission
prices have been fully adequate to compensate producers, see Spritzer, Changing Ele-
ments in the Natural Gas Picture: Implications for the Federal Regulatory Scheme, Id.
113, 123-25.
36. Moody, supra note 34, at 45-46. While sales of gas in interstate commerce
have been limited to about fifty cents per Mcf, prior to the issuance of Federal Power
Commission Opinion No. 770, intrastate sales had risen to $1.50 to $2.00 per Mef.
[1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 138, at G-1.
37. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market
Under Mineral Leases, 27th Om & GAS INST. 177, 190-92 (Matthew Bender 1976).
38. Moody, supra note 34, at 46-47.
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growth of its regulation of price, has been led to the control of the end-
use of gas in interstate commerce and to the establishment of priorities
in regulating pipelines which must curtail their delivery of gas under
contracts to purchasers. 39
Since the case of FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
in 1961, it has been accepted that the Commission has the authority
to consider the end-use to which jurisdictional gas may be put in decid-
ing whether to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity.40
The Supreme Court held in that case that the Commission could deny
a certificate if granting the certificate would not be in the public inter-
est, and the end-use of the gas was held to be one of the factors that
could be considered in ascertaining the public interest. End-use con-
trol has become an important factor in certification proceedings before
the FPC.41
The curtailments policy of the FPC also reflects control over the
end-use to which natural gas subject to the FPC's jurisdiction is put.
The problem arose when it became apparent in 1970 and 1971 that
some gas pipelines would be unable to fulfill their contractual obliga-
tions to customers.42 FPC Order No. 431 required jurisdictional pipe-
lines to report whether they would be able to fulfill their contracts and
to file proposals for curtailing deliveries on the basis of broad policies
stated by the order.43 In subsequent opinions the Commission stated
its curtailments priorities more explicitly. 44 It established categories
based on end-use, and a pipeline was required to curtail all deliveries to a
lower category before curtailing deliveries to the next higher category.
Highest in priority have been domestic consumers of natural gas and
the lowest category has been boiler fuel use.
A major problem with the FPC's curtailments policy is that it is
applied on a pipeline-by-pipeline basis. Thus one pipeline may have
39. See generally Stowe, Conservation and the Commission: The Growth of Regu-
lation of the End Use of Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 3 ENVT'L
AFF. 527 (1974).
40. 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
41. WmLAMS, MAxwVLL & MYEPS, supra note 10, at 85.
42. The development of the curtailments policy is discussed fully in Louisiana v.
FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Comment, FPC Natural Gas Alloca-
tlion: Curtailment in Context, 50 TExAs L. Rav. 1370 (1972); Tiano, The Limits of
Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Curtailments, 64 GEo. LJ. 27 (1975).
43. 18 C.F.R. § 2.70 (1972). The validity of Order No. 431 was upheld in FPC
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
44. Opinion Nos. 647 & 647-A (1973), affd, Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th
Cir. 1974).
45. Louisiana v. FP0, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974).
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sufficient gas to supply its customers for even some boiler fuel use while
another pipeline is faced with such a shortage that it must curtail deliv-
very for some of its highest priority customers. However, any other
approach might require confiscation of one pipeline's gas to give it to
another. A second problem is that the FPC's priorities are not those
that the pipeline would establish if it were trying to limit its total liability
to customers to which it has been unable to make deliveries in amounts
required by its contracts. A pipeline unable to fulfill all of its contracts
would deliver gas to the customers who would expose the pipeline to
the greatest liability if they did not receive the gas; the pipeline would
not deliver gas to a customer who would not be able to hold the pipe-
line liable for large damages because of the nondelivery. Thus the
priorities established by the FPC can greatly affect the potential liabil-
ity of pipelines for failure to live up to their contracts. However, it
has been held that the Commission lacks the authority to absolve pipe-
lines subject to its orders from the liability that may result from adher-
ence to the FPC's curtailments priorities.46 Potential liability from
current litigation is estimated to be over one billion dollars.47
The enormous problems caused by the regulation of the wellhead
price of natural gas in interstate commerce have been widely acknowl-
edged by scholars, government officials, producers, pipelines, large
consumers and others familiar with the history of the subject. Many
have called for the deregulation of natural gas prices as the only effec-
tive method of dealing with the situation.48 However, the Congress has
narrowly defeated a bill designed to accomplish this, and there is strong
support in Congress for doing just the opposite, that is, requiring regula-
tion of intrastate prices as well as interstate rates.49 The large increase
in rates allowed by Opinion No. 770 appears to have killed temporarily
the prospects for change in either direction.Y' Opinion No. 770 is a
step in the right direction, but the immense problems with natural gas
46. Id. at 867-68. Numerous suits for damages have been filed. E.g., New Orleans
v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 390 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1974). The Fifth Circuit re-
cently upheld the granting of a stay of all proceedings to await a response of the Federal
Power Commission as to its primary jurisdiction over the curtailment question. Mis-
sissippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 532 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976).
47. Brief for Appellee at 13, Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 532 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. E.g., P. McAvoY & P, PINDYCE, PRICE COTROLS AND THE NATURAL GAS
SHORTAGE (1975).
49. 73 Om. & GAs J., Feb. 24, 1975, at 46; CAPrrAL ENERGY L.TrER, No. 138,
Sept. 7, 1976, at 1.
50. FosTnE NATuRAL GAs REP., No. 1065, August 12, 1976, at 8.
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will remain until the price of gas is allowed to reflect its true value to
purchasers.
Current Price Control and Allocation of Oil
Federal policies on crude oil and its products are no better than
those for natural gas and in some respects are worse. They at least
have the virtue that they are said to be temporary, with a date speci-
fied by statute for their phasing out.51 However, it seems likely that
they will be continued beyond that time.
Price controls on oil were initiated as part of a wider scheme of
economic regulation undertaken pursuant to the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970.52 Wage and price controls were applied by the Cost of
Living Council throughout the economy in 1971 but were phased out
in 1973 in favor of voluntary restraints on prices. Controls were reim-
posed in March, 1973 for the petroleum industry. In November of the
same year the Economic Stabilization Act was superseded by the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA) which, as amended,
has served as the basis for controls since then.53 The Cost of Living
Council was replaced by the Federal Energy Office established by the
President in December, 1973. It was in turn replaced by the Federal
Energy Administration (FEA) established by congressional act in
1974.54
The controls on oil instituted under EPAA have created one of
the most complex, cumbersome, and onerous regulatory systems admin-
istered by the federal government. The principal purpose of the
EPAA is itself not undesirable: it is to mitigate the effects on the
American public of the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 and the concur-
rent drastic increase in the price of petroleum on the world market.55
However, the embargo has long since ended, and the price increase
51. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 760g (Supp. V
1975).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. IV 1974). The background and operation of the con-
trols are discussed in Langdon, FEA Price Controls for Crude Oil and Refined Pe-
troleum Products, 26th Om & GAS INsT. 55 (Matthew Bender 1975); Wakefield,
Allocation, Price Control and the FEA: Regulatory Policy and Practice in the Political
Arena, 21 RocKY MT. MiN. L. INST. 257 (1975); Summers, The Case for Decontrolling
the Price and Allocation of Crude Oil, 53 TuXAs L. REv. 1275 (1975).
53. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (Supp.
V 1975).
54. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-786 (Supp.
V 1975).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 751 (Supp. V 1975).
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appears to be permanent. The controls remain and will continue for
years more.
As with the price controls on natural gas, a two-tier system was
initially employed for crude oil. 0 Oil already under production was
deemed "old oil" and was allowed to be sold only at a low price. To
encourage greater exploration and production, oil produced after a
specified date was deemed "new oil" and was exempted from price
control. Of course the authority of Congress could not extend to other
countries, so imported oil was and is exempt from price limitations.
The method of determination of what is "old oil" has been troublesome.
It has depended upon the proper definition of the term "property" in
the federal regulations. "Property" is "the right which arises from a
lease or from a fee interest to produce domestic crude oil."' 57 "Old"
oil was the amount of oil produced from a particular "property" below
that "property's" "Base Production Control Level" (BPCL).r s The
BPCL for any month was determined by comparing production for the
same month from the same "property" in 1972, or if oil was not pro-
duced and sold in every month in 1972 then the BPCL was the total
amount produced for 1972 devided by 12. Each barrel of oil produced
above the BPCL was deemed "new" oil and was exempt from price
control. In addition, for each barrel of "new" oil produced the pro-
ducer was allowed to treat one barrel of "old" oil as "released" oil
which was also exempt.
The problem with the definition of "property" stems from the fact
that a given tract of land may contain multiple reservoirs of oil. To
give maximum incentive to increased production, each reservoir should
be treated as a separate property. Some producers so treated it
because the regulatory definition was ambiguous. The FEA has
recently declared that this was proper in some circumstances and will
prospectively treat each reservoir as a separate "property" if the state
agency which regulates production so recognizes the reservoirs.59
Unlike controls on natural gas, the prices for crude oil have not
been based on cost. They have been determined arbitrarily. The
price for "old" oil was set at the posted price for that oil on May 15,
1973 plus $1.35 per barrel.60 The average price for "old" oil has been
56. The price regulations are contained in 10 C.F.R. § 212 (1976).
57. 10 C.F.R. § 212.72 (1976).
58. Id.
59. See 41 Fed. Reg. 36,172-85 (1976) revising the interpretation of "property"
given by FEA Ruling 1975-15.
60. The price setting at this level was upheld in Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064
(Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
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about $5.25 per barrel as a result. The price for oil exempt from price
controls has been determined by the world market price which is unre-
lated to cost of production.
One other category of crude oil exempted from price controls has
been "stripper well" oil. Approximately thirteen percent of 'the total
crude oil produced in the United States is produced from marginal wells
that average less than ten barrels production per day. To avoid pre-
mature shutting down of these wells they were provided an exemption
from the controls. 1 Initially the regulations afforded an exemption
only in the year following a calendar year in which production from
the lease was at or below the stripper well level of an average of ten
barrels or less per well per day. This regulation created a disincentive
to production increases, for if a producer went above the stripper well
definition amount he lost his stripper well classification, and a portion
of his production was then treated as "old" oil. An amendment to' the
regulation was necessary, and the regulations have since removed this
disincentive to production increases.0 2 It is not possible to ascertain
how much production was inhibited by the regulations when they were
in effect, but this is one example of the unintended, undesirable conse-
quences that can result from price controls.
There have been price controls on petroleum products as well as
on crude oil. These prices have been determined by reference to a
"base price" for refiners calculated as of May 15, 1973 plus cost
increases permitted by the FEA.63 This allows refiners, wholesalers
and retailers, to passthrough certain increased costs on a dollar-for-
dollar basis. The time and manner of passing through costs has been
elaborate, and in some cases, the competitive market has not permitted
passthrough of costs.64 In some instances the regulations will not per-
mit a later passthrough (known as "banking") of certain -cost in-
creases.6 5 The FEA is currently phasing out some product price con-
trols since maintenance of crude oil price controls in a competitive
product market will serve to keep product prices low. 6
61. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, §-406(a), 87
Stat. 590 (1973). The current stripper well exemption is contained in Pub. L. No. 94-
385, § 121, 90 Stat. 1132 (1976).
62. 10 C.F.R. § 212.54(c) (1976) (formerly 10 C.F.R. § 210.32(b)). Explanation
for the regulatory change is given in 40 Fed. Reg. 22,123 (1975).
63. 10 C.F.R. H9 212.82-.83, 212.92-.93 (1976).
64. Misinterpretation of the passthrough regulations has led to controversy between
Congress, the FEA and industry. See [1976] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 163, at A-1
to A-5.
65. 10 C.F.R. H9 212.83, 212.93 (1976).
66. See [1976] EN. UsERs RPr. (BNA), No. 163, at A-5.
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By passage of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,
Congress increased the complexity of the price controls.6 7 In Decem-
ber, 1975 the EPAA was amended to provide for continuation of price
controls for another forty months. The controls were made more strin-
gent in some respects. The amendments mandated that the FEA set
prices for domestic crude oil so that it would have an initial average
price of $7.66 per barrel. 68 This required a "rollback" in domestic
crude oil prices.
In response to the amendments to the EPAA, the FEA has estab-
lished what amounts to a three tier price system. Lower tier oil is
priced in essentially the same manner as "old" oil was priced. How-
ever, a new BPCL has been established: the producer may use his pro-
duction for 1975 for the BPCL or he may use a BPCL based on 1972
production if he has reason to want to use it."" The BPCL may be
adjusted each six months to take into consideration the natural decline
in production caused by reduction of the energy of a reservoir. 70  Oil
qualifying for the upper tier ceiling price is that oil produced from a
specific property in excess of the revised BPCL.7' There is no longer
a provision for "released" oil. The price of upper tier oil is determined
by first calculating the total amount of domestic production for the
accounting period in question. The percentage of that total which is
lower tier oil multiplied by the average price of lower tier oil, added
to the percentage of the total which is treated as upper tier oil, multi-
plied by the average price to be set for the upper tier oil will be equal
to the composite price mandated or allowed by Congress and the
FEA.72 Expressed as a mathematical formula, the equation appears
as follows, using the approximate percentage of lower and upper-tier
oil in a recent period, the average price of $5.25 for lower-tier oil, and
the congressionally mandated initial composite price of $7.66 per
barrel of domestic production:
(.6) ($5.25) + (.4) (X) = $7.66
X (Upper tier average ceiling price) = $11.28
To calculate the upper tier ceiling price for a particular grade of crude
oil from a particular field it is necessary to establish a base point (i.e.
September 30, 1975). The highest posted prices for crude oil on that
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6201-6422 (Supp. V 1975).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 757(a) (Supp. V 1975).
69. 10 C.F.R. § 212.72 (1976).
70. 41 Fed. Reg. 15,574 (1976) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 212.76).
71. 10 C.F.R. § 212.72 (1976); 10 C.F.R. § 212.74(a) (1976).
72. 41 Fed. Reg. 4931-41, 15,566-75 (1976).
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date may be averaged. By subtracting from this average the X just
established, one has a differential that may be used to calculate a price
for different grades of crude. For example, if the base point average
posted price was $12.60 and an average upper tier ceiling price of
$11.28 is desired, the difference between these is $1.32, and the price
of a particular grade of oil from a particular field can be calculated by
subtracting $1.32 from the base point highest posted price for that
grade of crude oil from that field.73
The amendments allow for a gradual increase in the composite
price to account for inflation and to give added incentive for new pro-
duction.74  However, the gradual increase is limited to no more than
ten percent per year without congressional approval even if inflation
exceeds this percentage. 75
A perusal of the above equation should indicate that it is possible
for X to decrease as more upper tier oil is found and produced or as
lower tier oil decreases as a percentage of the total due to natural
decline in production from old fields. That is to say, in making their
business decisions, business planners must calculate that if they are
successful in producing more oil, they are actually lowering the price
that they may receive for it. The large surge in production of upper
tier oil which is anticipated following the completion of the Trans-
Alaska pipeline presents this problem in an acute form. If an adjust-
ment is not made in the EPAA, the FEA will have to lower the price
of other domestic oil by a substantial amount. The EPAA has deferred
making a decision concerning this problem until April 15, 1977, when
the President is to recommend a solution.76 Miscalculation of any of
the figures in the equation by the FEA can lead to overcharges or
undercharges that must be made up at a later time.77  The difficulty
of this can be better appreciated when it is observed that each producer
pays royalties to thousands of royalty owners on the basis of the price
allowed on the crude oil to the producer. To make adjustments for
each royalty owner may be nearly impossible.
73. Id. The author may have oversimplified the FEA's procedure and distorted
it slightly. It should be added that the FEA has calculated a table of adjustments pur-
suant to the authority granted in 15 U.S.C. § 757(d) (Supp. V 1975). However, the
FEA has had to "freeze" the adjustments because the actual price of oil has exceeded
the statutory composite price. [1976] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 161, at A-8 to A-10.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 757(d) (Supp. V 1975).
75. Id.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 757(g) (Supp. V 1975).
77. See note 73 supra.
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A third tier of crude oil prices is created by that crude which is
exempt from controls. Imported crude is, of course, not subject to
price limitation. In addition, the Energy Conservation and Production
Act of 197678 amended the EPAA to exempt the first sale of "stripper
well" oil from controlS7 9 and requires amendment of the price regula-
tions to give additional price incentives to tertiary enhanced recovery
techniques. 0 To avoid serious distortion in calculating the price of
upper tier oil, "stripper well" oil is deemed to be upper tier oil for pur-
poses of calculating the upper tier price.
To police so complex a system of price controls an elaborate
enforcement mechanism has been necessary. Stiff civil and criminal
penalties are provided for violation of the regulations promulgated
under the EPAA. 81 Producers and refiners are subject to massive
reporting requirements concerning all production and sales of petro-
leum. The regulatory costs to the government and to industry are
immense.
The effects of price controls on crude oil and refined products
cannot be fully known at present, but certain conclusions are not
premature. First, it must be admitted that the controls have, to a
degree, insulated the United States from the harshness of the increases
in the price of oil on the world market. 2  Offsetting this benefit are
a number of problems and undesirable effects resulting from the price
controls. The controls and reporting requirements have been a costly
burden on both industry and government. Problems arising from
implementation and interpretation of the regulations have contributed
to public distrust of the oil companies and the agencies of government
regulating them.8 3 Conservation of energy has apparently been dis-
couraged by the controls. Although the public turned to small,
gasoline-stingy automobiles with the initial shock of price increases in
1974, Americans have returned to buying large, less efficient autos with
the assurance from Congress that gasoline price increases will be
limited for some time to come.8 4  The International Energy Agency
78. Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125 (1976) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
79. Pub. L. No. 94-385, § 121, 90 Stat. 1132 (1976).
80. Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 754 (Supp. V 1975).
82. Prices in the United States are considerably lower than in other countries.
[1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 164, at A-16.
83. E.g., the cost passthrough controversy, supra note 64.
84. The response of Congress has been to mandate increased mileage per gallon
of gasoline from the automobile manufacturers. Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
§ 502, 15 U.S.C. § 2002 (Supp. V 1975).
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(TEA) recently criticized the United States for its low oil prices which
have hampered efforts to encourage conservation.8 5  American efforts
to reduce consumption have not been as successful as have similar
efforts by other TEA member countries, and the low prices and taxes
are an important reason for this.
Uncertainty about future pricing policy has probably discouraged
the development of some high-cost crude oil, and it certainly has
limited the formation of capital available for such development. Also
the price controls have discouraged the development of alternative
energy sources. In the summer of 1975, the FEA estimated the
cost of producing oil from shale at between $12.00 and $15.00 per
barrel and for oil from coal at about $18.00 a barrel."6 If domestic
crude oil were allowed to rise to the world price, these substitutes would
probably become economically feasible. So long as petroleum is avail-
able at a controlled price below the price of substitutes, development
of these substitutes will not take place unless they are given some form
of subsidy. It should be noted that some refiners have been given
special treatment by statute or regulation in a manner that suggests the
use of the price controls to show political favoritism s.8
For states where severance taxes are calculated on the basis of a
percentage of the price of oil, the price controls have artificially
reduced the income available to the state. For both states and private
royalty owners, the price controls on oil have controlled the amount of
their royalties while prices of all that they purchase have been uncon-
trolled. This has contributed a feeling of ill will between producing
states and consuming states.88 In short, it is likely that the short-term
benefits received by the country from price controls on oil are out-
weighed by the long-run adverse effects.
Allocation of crude oil and refined products has also been
necessary because of shortages. Actual shortages have been handled
85. See [1976] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA), No. 164, at A-16.
86. 40 Fed. Reg. 30,033 (1975).
87. Wall St. J., June 21, 1976, at 16; see 122 CONG. REc. S9460-68 (daily ed. June
15, 1976).
88. See California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 430 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied
419 U.S. 1021 (1974). See address by Governor Edwin Edwards of Louisiana, Inter-
state Oil Compact Commission meeting, (Dec. 1974), discussing entitlements on middle
distillates: "A scheme has been proposed and it is going to be engineered which, in
effect, is going to result in saving the New England area $30 million. Well, let me
tell you something-there's a law of economics that when somebody saves $30 million,
somebody loses $30 million. There's no middle ground and you know who the losers
are going to be-the rest of the country-you and me." 33 Oi. & GAs COMPACT
BuLL., December, 1974, at 4.
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in several ways. One of these has been a freeze on supplier/purchaser
relationships as of specified dates for crude oil, residual fuel oil and
refined petroleum products.89 Thus, all suppliers have been required
to maintain their relationships with existing purchasers rather than shift
to others in a time of shortage. This freeze was inadequate to protect
many refiners for they were dependent on imported crude that was not
subject to the regulations. To equalize the availability of crude among
refiners, the Federal Energy Office (which was superseded by the
PEA) established a "buy/sell" regulation under which it issued a
quarterly list setting forth the purchase opportunities and sales obliga-
tions of all domestic refiners. 0 That is, refiners with crude oil were
required to sell some of it at controlled prices to refiners lacking suffi-
cient crude oil; the program dealt with actual shortages.
With the end of the Arab embargo the shortage of crude oil also
ended. However, the multiple tier pricing of domestic oil created a
shortage of "old" or lower tier price oil. The existence of this shortage
required the FEA to allocate available lower price oil among refiners.
Since lower price oil is physically indistinguishable from upper tier or
uncontrolled oil, it would be absurd to require physical transfer of oil
among refiners. To achieve the same objective of equalizing crude oil
cost to all refiners, the EA established its Cost Equalization Program
or Entitlements program. 91
Under the Entitlements program, the EA determines a national
crude oil supply/capacity ratio which is a representation of the amount
of price-controlled oil in the United States as a percentage of all oil.
It then issues entitlements to refiners based on the percentages thus
established. Refiners that have a higher percentage of lower priced
crude oil than the national average for all refiners must, in order to
process legally their own crude oil, buy entitlements from refiners that
have less than the national average of lower priced oil. The value of
an entitlement is set monthly by the EA taking into account the dif-
ferences between the controlled domestic oil and the uncontrolled
domestic and foreign oil. This program permits the PEA to accomplish
the same result as allocating the proper amounts of controlled oil among
all refiners to equalize the cost of crude to all without physical transfer
of the oil. A "small refiner bias" is built into the regulations to give
refiners with a daily average volume of less than 175,000 barrels for
89. 10 C.F.R. § 211.9 (1976).
90. 10 C.F.R. § 211.65 (1976).
91. 10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1976).
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a particular month additional entitlements, i.e. a special subsidy.92
Refiners that must buy entitlements may increase the prices of their
products, but the competitive market will not permit such a passthrough
in most circumstances, so what the entitlements program amounts to
is a method of transferring income from some refiners to other
refiners. 93
As with the previously discussed price controls, all the effects of
the entitlements program cannot be established at this time. It does
equalize the costs of crude oil to refiners. As a result it avoids large
regional differences in product prices and prevents refiners with lower-
cost domestic oil from gaining advantages over refiners who must rely
on higher priced oil. But at the same time it fails to discourage imports
and, in fact, may encourage reliance on imports. What incentive does
a refiner have not to import when it receives more entitlements for the
more oil it imports? Might not a domestic producer's development
plans be affected by the knowledge that the more oil it produces at
lower tier prices, the more it will have to pay for entitlement purchases
to process that oil? Such a producer may prefer to import oil at present
and wait for a later day to produce that domestic oil, a day when con-
trols are terminated and the oil's price is allowed to rise to reflect its
value in relation to other oil and fuels. It is the entitlements program
which leads one to doubt that controls will be removed from domestic
prices for quite some time. The reason is that oil classified now as
lower tier oil will continue to cost less to produce after controls are
lifted than it will cost to purchase imported oil. This means integrated
refiners with relatively greater access to such domestic oil will enjoy
a competitive advantage over those who will have to rely on greater
amounts of imported oil, and there is no indication that this will be more
politically acceptable when the EPAA controls are set to expire than
at the present.
There are severe problems with the entitlements program just as
there are very undesirable effects flowing from price controls on crude
oil. Having embarked on such a program, the way back to an uncon-
trolled market has become more difficult. Nevertheless, reliance on a
free market mechanism is much more likely to achieve the stated goals
of a sound energy policy than any other alternative.
92. Id. at (e).
93. The program has been held not to be an unconstitutional taking of property
without compensation. Cities Service Co. v. FEA, 529 F.2d 1016 (Emer. Ct. App.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3738 (1976).
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11. THE OBJECTIVE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MUST NOT
PREDOMINATE OVER OBJECTIVES OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Protection of the environment has become one of the most import-
ant objectives of recent legislation and judicial decisions at both
the state and federal levels. A number of federal and state acts have
been passed in recent years to preserve and enhance the quality of all
aspects of the environment, and they have been enforced zealously. 4
Their effect, for the most part, has been salutary. However, efforts
to prevent potential harm to the environment have been a major
hindrance to new energy development. Absolutist goals of protection
and excessive fear of pollution have significantly delayed essential
energy projects.
As pointed out earlier, a major shortcoming of the market system
is that it ignores certain costs referred to as externalties.05 Air and
water have long been regarded as free commodities for use by anyone
who wished to use or pollute them without constituting a legally recog-
nized nuisance to another person. 96 While this was acceptable so long
as the capacity of the air or water to clean itself was not exceeded, pol-
lution has gone beyond this level in recent years. People have become
aware of the true costs of development and have sought ways in which
to limit pollution and limit or prevent future encroachments by man on
the environment. Some have gone too far, assuming that the existence
of any pollution is bad in itself and that no new development should
take place that threatens harm to the envorinment.97 Adverse environ-
mental impacts from a project should be limited, but it is inevitable that
they will occur; it will be impossible to maintain a decent standard of
living without accepting some compromises on environmental protec-
tion. How and where these compromises should be made are the sub-
ject of this and the next section. Identifying the areas in which envi-
romental concerns have impeded energy development will suggest the
problems involved.
94. Of special importance are the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970); the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857-18571 (1970); and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. H§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
95. See note 14 supra.
96. See W. PRossER, HANDimOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, Ch. 15 (4th ed. 1971).
97. This is the thrust of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of
1972 which have as a goal no discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975), and the nondegradation policy of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-18571 (1970); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C. 1972), aj'd per curiam, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
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Perhaps the most notorious case of environmentalists blocking a
vital energy project is the Trans-Alaska Pipeline controversy.98 This
confrontation grew out of the discovery of large quantities of oil on the
North Slope of Alaska bordering the Arctic Sea in 1967 and 1968.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) was formed in 1968 by a
group of companies to transport the crude oil, estimated to be about
two million barrels per day (more than twelve percent of total domestic
consumption), to a location from which it could be carried by tanker
to the lower forty-eight states.99 In February, 1969 TAPS applied
for right-of-way permits from the Department of Interior to allow con-
struction of the pipeline across federal lands.. A special governmental
task force was created to scrutinize all aspects of the project. The
Interior Department finally determined that it would grant the permits
if certain steps were taken to insure protection of the delicate environ-
ment where the pipeline would be located. The project then ran afoul
of two pieces of legislation: the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920100 and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).1 1'
On January 1, 1970 NEPA was signed into law. Deceptively
innocuous in appearance, NEPA has become a tool for modifying or
halting virtually any type of activity in which the federal government
participates.' °2 Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA has been the most impor-
tant provision of the Act. It requires that an environmental impact
statement (EIS) be filed for "every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment ...."103 Although the
Act states briefly what should be included in the impact statement, it
is so general that almost any impact statement can be challenged on the
grounds that it is "inadequate" in that it fails to consider all reasonable
alternatives or all environmental impacts. The Act does not expressly
give anyone the right to sue for alleged violations, but the courts have
consistently held that private parties may bring an action even if the
98. See generally Myers, Federal Decisionmaking and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline,
4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 915 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Myers]; Dominick & Brody, The Alaska
Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act, 23 AM. U.L. Rav. 337 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dominick & Brody].
99. Myers, supra note 98, at 917 n.9.
100. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
102. E.g., Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); Billings v. Camp, 4 ERC
1744 (D.D.C. 1972).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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possibility of an adverse effect on an interest of the complaining party
is speculative and remote.10 4
To comply with the requirements of the then just enacted NEPA,
the Interior Department released a brief statement discussing the prob-
able impact on the environment affected by the portion of the pipeline
project for which a permit was to be issued. A week later several
environmentalist organizations sought and were granted an injunction
against the project on the grounds that the permit was for a wider right-
of-way than allowed by the Mineral Leasing Act. 0 r A wider right-
of-way was essential because the proposed pipeline was wider than
pipelines in use when the statutory limitation was imposed.
Two years later the pipeline system, now named Alyeska, again
filed for a right-of-way and temporary use of such land as would be
necessary for construction of the pipeline. The Interior Department
granted the permits, but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia enjoined the project again. 10 6 This time the complaint
alleged not only violation of the Mineral Leasing Act but also of NEPA.
A massive environmental statement costing some nine million dollars
had been issued after extensive hearings and studies, but the environ-
mentalists alleged that alternative routes for the crude oil had not been
adequately treated in the EIS. Judge Wright said that the temporary
use permits were not authorized by the Mineral Leasing Act but
declined to decide the NEPA claims.10 7
The only way to break the impasse between the proponents of the
project and the environmentalists was a congressional act specifically
authorizing the pipeline and exempting the Interior Department from
further NEPA compliance.'08 By the time this occurred in November,
1973, the project had been stalled nearly four years and its costs had
104. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) remains the authoritative statement
of standing requirements. That these are easy to meet is illustrated in Sierra Club v.
Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972) and Scientists' Inst. for Public Information,
Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
105. Wilderness Soe'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). As pointed out
by Senator Dominick and David Brody, the Mineral Leasing Act "has been no more
than a vehicle or an expedient used by all parties and by the judicial branch in order
to present to the Congress the real issue-Whether the Alaska pipeline should be con-
structed, not whether the oil companies get fifty feet instead of two hundred in order
to do so." Dominick & Brody, supra note 98, at 386.
106. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
917 (1973).
107. 479 F.2d at 891.
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increased tremendously. It is doubtful that the delay produced signifi-
cant benefits to the environment, and failure to bring the North Slope
oil to refineries has prevented the United States from decreasing its re-
liance on imported oil.
Environmental concerns and NEPA have also hindered develop-
ment of oil and gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).
Sales of leases on the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico have been enjoined
on the grounds that an environmental impact statement was inadequate
in its discussion of alternatives to the proposed sale, even when those
alternatives to the sale were beyond the authority of the Department
of the Interior which is responsible for OCS leasing. 09 Lengthy hear-
ings and compilation of data for an EIS in compliance with NEPA have
delayed opening up new areas for OCS drilling and production."10 A
holding by a federal district court judge that an EIS was inadequate
nearly prevented the first lease sale of the Atlantic OCS."'1 Public out-
cry and fear of further oil pollution following the large spill in the Santa
Barbara Channel in January, 1969 resulted in a long shutdown of off-
shore production in that area." 2 Several bills with strong support were
before the ninety-fourth Congress to amend the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act.' These would have added other provisions in the
name of protection of the environment further hindering production of
OCS oil and gas." 4
Continued production from, and new development of, oil and gas
reservoirs onshore have recently been threatened by proposed regula-
tions under the Safe Drinking Water Act.",, Although this act specifi-
cally provides that the federal regulations to be adopted for under-
ground injection control programs "may not prescribe requirements
which interfere with or impede-(A) the underground injection of
brine or other fluids which are brought to the surface in connection with
oil or natural gas production, or (B) any underground injection for the
secondary or tertiary recovery of oil or natural gas, unless such require-
109. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
110. See 73 On. & GAs J., February 17, 1975, at 33-35.
111. Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, No. 75 C 208 and New York v. Kleppe, No. 76 C
1229 (E.D.N.Y., August 13, 1976), excerpted in [1976] EN. UsERs REP. (BNA), No.
158, at A-20.
112. L. DYE, BLOWOUT AT PLATFORn A-THE CRIsIs THAT AWAKENED A NATION
(1975); Union Oil Co. of California v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970).
114. E.g., S. 521, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976).
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f to 300j-9 (Supp. 1976).
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ments are essential to assure that underground sources of drinking
water will not be endangered by such injection,"" 6 the regulations
which have been developed by the Environmental Protection Agency
could have a significant adverse effect on oil and gas production.""
Federal regulations of this nature may be superfluous, since state regu-
latory bodies have for years adequately protected water resources from
contamination by oil and gas operations.
Turning from oil and gas operations to hard minerals, environ-
mental laws, regulations, and litigation have hindered coal development
and utilization in several ways. Concern that the coal leasing program
on federal lands had "gotten out of hand" caused the Department of
the Interior to halt all sales of coal leases in 1971 pending a revision
of departmental regulations."" The moratorium was lifted as of June
1, 1976 in conjunction with the promulgation by the Interior De-
partment of the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System
(EMARS)."29  While EMARS appears to be a workable system,
nevertheless the time it has taken to develop has been lost time for
coal development, and as a new system it has points of interpretation
that will lead to uncertainty for some time.
Just on the heels of the adoption of EMARS Congress enacted the
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act.120  Becoming effective after
the override of a presidential veto, this Act amends the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920.121 It will probably cause still further substantial delays
in coal development on federal lands.' 2  One of its requirements is
that no lease sale may be held unless the lands containing the coal
deposits have been included in a comprehensive land use plan and the
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
117. An Interstate Oil Compact Commission resolution of June 30, 1976 declared:
'The state regulatory agencies estimate that if the recent draft regulations went into
effect it would cause a loss of production of over 500,000 barrels of oil per day and
in excess of 2.5 billion cubic feet of gas per day. All of this is from existing wells
that have been producing for a number of years with virtually no adverse impact on
the environment." 35 OrL & GAS COMPACT BuLL., June, 1976, at 13.
118. Roland G. Robinson, The New Federal Coal Leasing Policy, The First Steps
(Aug. 23, 1976) (paper presented to the Conference on Energy and the Public Lands,
Park City, Utah) [1976] SC' y INTERioR ANN. RrP. 67.
119. 41 Fed. Reg. 22,051 (1976).
120. Act of Aug. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified in scattered
sections of 30, 33 U.S.C.).
121. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
122. Remarks of Secretary of the Interior Thomas S. Kleppe before the National
Coal Association and Bituminous Coal Research, Inc. Conference, Department of the
Interior News Release at 3 (October 19, 1976).
[Vol. 12:65
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/2
AMERICAN ENERGY POLICY
sale is compatible with the plan. 23 Development of such land use
plans will be fraught with difficulty and could take years to implement.
Additional uncertainty in coal leasing on federal lands has been
caused by a NEPA challenge to the Interior Department's approach to
preparation of environmental impact statements for coal leases. The
Interior Department has elected to prepare regional environmental
impact statements covering regions distinguished by common basin
boundaries, drainage areas, economic interdependence, or other com-
mon characteristics. The Sierra Club and other organizations chal-
lenged this under NEPA on the grounds that an EIS should cover a
much larger area since later decisions on development in the area will
be affected by the earlier decision. More specifically, the Sierra Club
maintained that the EIS for the Powder River Coal Basin in Wyoming
covered too small an area; instead, they claimed, the EIS should
embrace the entire four state area known as the "Northern Great Plains
region." The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed the trial court's denial of an injunction against leasing and
remanded for a determination whether the action was ripe for prepara-
tion of a larger EIS. 2 4 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this de-
cision and held that the EIS for the smaller region would suffice. 12 5 The
opinion probably represents a general cutting back by the Court on the
reach of NEPA.12 6
Despite hindrances to coal development on federal lands, a great
amount of coal has been available. Some of it may not be utilized,
however, because burning it will produce air pollution which is pro-
hibited by the Clean Air Act of 1970.127 The Clean Air Act, as
amended, provides an elaborate system for achieving national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards through federal standards
for new sources and state implementation plans. To limit or reduce
levels of pollution in the air, the new source standards and state plans
require that sources of pollution produce no more than specified
amounts or concentrations of particular pollutants. Sulfur oxides, nitro-
gen oxides, and particulate matter are three important classes of pol-
123. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i), cited in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1084.
124. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
125. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 44 U.S.L.W. 5104 (1976).
126. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 44 U.S.L.W. 4954
(1976).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (Supp. V 1975); see generally Comment, The Impact
of Current Air Pollution Legislation and Litigation on Energy Production, 54 ORE.
L. REv. 515 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Pollution Legislation].
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lution that are limited.' 28 Much coal currently produced in the United
States is relatively high in sulfur content and when burned leads to dis-
charges of sulfur oxide. 2 ' Large quantities of particulate matter are
also produced when coal is burned. 80 Technology is not yet advanced
sufficiently to provide reliable methods of removing the pollutants when
emitted into the air. To comply with state and federal requirements,
only coal with low sulfur content may be burned. This effectively
limits coal utilization in many circumstances.' 8 ' Recognizing this,
Congress in 1974 amended the Clean Air Act once again in the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act.18 2 The amendments are,
however, so stringent that it is doubtful that they facilitate the greater
use of coal. The Clean Air Act requirements are especially difficult
because they have been interpreted by the courts as prohibiting any
significant deterioration in the air quality of a region. 8 8 This limits
development of almost any sort that produces pollution, particularly in
industries that might otherwise wish to rely on a comparatively dirty
fuel like coal.
Fear of potential harm to the natural environment and to people
has been a major obstacle to greater use of the potential that nuclear
power holds for the future. 8 4  Opposition to increased nuclear power
generating capacity has been widespread and has produced important
litigation interpreting the requirements of NEPA. In the case of
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 8 , Judge Wright held
that the Commission [now succeeded by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission] has to "take the initiative of considering environmental
values at every distinctive and comprehensive state of the process" of
reviewing applications for licenses for nuclear facilities. 88 Commis-
sion procedures had to be revised to comply with the decision.
128. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-.7, .11 (1975).
129. Hunter, Low Sulfur Coal Supplies for Environmental Purposes, in POLLUTION
CONTROL AND ENERGY NEEDs, 17, 19 (R. Jimeson & R. Spindt eds. 1973).
130. ENERGY POLICY PROrc OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A Tm TO CHOOSE:
AMERICA'S ENERGY FUuRE, 194-96 (1974).
131. See Pollution Legislation, supra note 127, at 517-18.
132. Act of June 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 3, 88 Stat. 256 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15, 30 U.S.C.).
133. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), af'd per curlam,
412 U.S. 541 (1973).
134. ENERGY PoLIcY PRoJECr OF THE FORD FouNmATION, A TME TO CHoosE:
AMmuCA's ENERGY FtrrmE, 203-25 (1974); ENERGY ALTERNATVES: A CompARATIn
ANALYSIS, chs. 6-7 (1975).
135. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
136. Id. at 1119. See Bronstein, The AEC Decision-Making Process and the Envi-
ronment: A Case Study of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 689
[Vol. 12:65
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/2
AMERICAN ENERGY POLICY
Judge Wright was also responsible for the decision in the case of
Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC.137 Here the
court held that NEPA required an EIS to be prepared for a research
program on the liquid metal fast breeder reactor, even though the
research program itself would have no environmental impacts beyond
those of individual facilities-for which the AEC planned to prepare
statements. Wright reasoned that the commitment of funds to this pro-
gram itself precluded or at least hindered the development of other pro-
grams that might have fewer adverse impacts.
Where nuclear plants will be built is an especially important ques-
tion for the future. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 requires
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to make a national survey to locate
and identify possible nuclear energy center sites. 138  Although this
seems to be a step toward establishing new nuclear power plants, it
could be a possible source of delay: development may be slowed while
the survey is being undertaken, and many promising sites may be ruled
out on environmental grounds.
What has been discussed thus far on environmental impacts on
energy development is only a brief treatment of a large subject. It is
sufficient to indicate that environmental concerns have significantly
hindered and threaten to further hinder the development of American
energy resources. Some limitations are necessary if we are to have
pleasant and healthy surroundings and fulfill our commitments to future
generations, but fear of adverse impacts on the environment should not
be allowed to preclude or unnecessarily delay essential energy develop-
ment. Compromises must be made in order to have both environmen-
tal protection and assured supplies of energy. Who is to make such
compromises?
III. NATIONAL GOALS MUST PREVAIL OVER
STATE AND LocAL INTERESTS
All states are consumers of energy, but some of the most populous
states with high energy demands produce little or no energy and must
rely on imports from other states and abroad. Even though not
producers, these states may have locations for the processing of energy
(1971); Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A
Comment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. LJ. 645
t1972).
137. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 5847 (Supp. V 1975).
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supplies, such as sites for refineries or ports where crude oil arriving
by sea may be landed, or they may be adjacent to production areas,
such as the Outer Continental Shelf. Other states export more energy
than they consume and rely upon taxation of energy as a major source
of their revenue. These factors raise many points of possible conflict
among the states and between particular states and the federal govern-
ment.
Conflict over control and use of petroleum has existed for many
years in the United States. As early as 1911, the United States
Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the trans-
portation of natural gas out of the state. 3 9 The Court admitted the
right of the state to control and prohibit waste, but concluded the state's
purpose was commercial in nature, and not for the purpose of conser-
vation. Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court, stated:
The statute of Oklahoma recognizes it [natural gas] to be a
subject of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prohibit it from
being the subject of interstate commerce, and this is the pur-
pose of its conservation. In other words, the purpose of its
conservation is in a sense commercial-the business welfare
of the State, as coal might be, or timber . . . To what conse-
quences does such power tend? If one State has it, all States
have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce
will be halted at state lines.140
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court in 1923 invalidated a West Vir-
ginia statute which required pipeline companies to give West Virginia
consumers a preferred right to purchase over consumers in other
states.141 The statute then was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.
After the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power Commission
was required to regulate the field price of natural gas, several cases
came before the Court in which states had attempted to prevent sales
of natural gas at prices thought to be too low by the state's regulatory
agency for petroleum. In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma,1 42 the
Supreme Court held that an Oklahoma Corporation Commission order
fixing the minimum price for natural gas was invalid because it con-
flicted with the authority of the Federal Power Commission to set
139. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
140. Id. at 255.
141. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
142. 349 U.S. 44 (1954). Without such FPC preemption, the Court had previously
held such an order to be valid. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co,,
340 U.S. 179 (1950).
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prices. The Court set forth its preemption position in more detail in
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas,
wherein the Court struck down orders which required an interstate
pipeline company to purchase natural gas ratably from all wells
connecting to its pipeline system.143 The Court held that the "federal
regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct regulation of the
prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas . . .or for state regula-
tions which would indirectly achieve the same result." 1"
More recently the Supreme Court has upheld a lower court's deci-
sion which struck down regulations by the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission forbidding the sale of natural gas at prices below twenty
cents per thousand cubic feet.'45 The three-judge panel had found
that "the orders in question would burden interstate commerce by
indirectly fixing prices to interstate consumers,"1 46 and that the orders
"conflict with the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under
the Natural Gas Act."'147
Although the state may not fix a minimum price for the natural
gas or oil in interstate commerce, it may place a gross production or
severance tax on petroleum either at a flat rate per volume' 48 or as a
percentage of its value.149 Such taxes are not unconstitutional despite
the fact that they obviously act to raise the price or to set a minimum
price for the oil or gas above the sale price. The states with a large
volume of production enjoy considerable revenue from taxes on the
petroleum produced. 50 However, these states recognize that the oil
and gas reserves will become depleted within a relatively short span
of time, and the revenue which they now receive will cease. These
same producing states may also receive revenue from royalties on oil
and gas produced from state lands: when the state leases state land
it will retain a royalty interest and will be able to receive the proceeds
143. 372 U.S. 84, 91, reh. denied, 372 U.S. 960 (1963).
144. Id. 372 U.S. 91.
145. Oklahoma Corporation Comm'n v. FPC, 362 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla. 1973),
afrd, 415 U.S. 961 (1974).
146. 362 F. Supp. at 533.
147. Id. at 537.
148. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1929).
149. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927). See generally Hartman,
The Commerce Clause and the States' Power to Tax the Oil and Gas Industry, 7TH
Oi. & GAS INsT. 387 (Matthew Bender 1956); Note, Federal Limitations on State
Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HAIRv. L. REv. 953 (1962).
150. See Barsh, The Goal of Energy Self-Sufficiency in the State of Louisiana, 17
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT CoMM'N Comm. BuLL. 18 (December, 1975); Talley, Texas
Energy Self-Sufficiency, id. at 32.
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from the sale of oil or gas produced or will have the right to take the
oil production in kind.'51 In addition, the state may receive revenue
through taxation of the income of a producer or seller or of the income
of a royalty owner.
The impact on producing states' economies of federal price
controls on oil and gas can be significant. Price controls on the well-
head price of oil and gas can limit the revenue available to a producing
state from gross production or severance taxes if such taxes are based
on a percentage of the sales price. The price controls have been
applied to state royalty oil, and this directly limits the revenue to a state
from the sale of its own oil.' 52 Since the price controls limit the income
available to producers of oil, they limit the income taxation to the state
on that income. Thus the producing states sometimes feel that their
resources are passing into other hands and the consuming states are
preventing them from receiving their fair portion of the value of their
resources; once the petroleum has been produced this tax base is gone
forever. The other side of the coin is that consuming states may feel
that the severance taxes are unwarranted and unnecessarily raise the
price of the minerals. One author has referred to states with such
severance taxes as "resource profiteers.' 8
As pointed out in the first section of this essay, the historically low
Federal Power Commission price controls on natural gas in interstate
commerce have had the effect of forcing gas into the intrastate market.
In response, the Federal Power Commission has made strong efforts
to insure that once natural gas from a field has become subject to Fed-
eral Power Commission jurisdiction, the gas in that field will remain
subject to its jurisdiction.'54 Some producing states have taken steps
to retain natural gas within their borders short of the measures pre-
viously described which were found to be unconstitutional. 15  The up-
shot has been an effort in Congress to bring all gas presently in intra-
151. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:127 (West 1975).
152. California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 430 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1021 (1974).
153. Note, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HAiV.
L. REv. 953, at 970-71 (1962).
154. See FPC Opinion No. 733 (1975) (Mitchell Energy Corp.); FPC Opinion
No. 737 (1975) (Southland Royalty Corp.). See also FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
155. E.g., Louisiana's Natural Resources and Energy Act which states that its intent
is "to encourage, direct, mandate and enforce the use of excess capacity of intrastate
pipelines to foster the movement of intrastate gas about the state of Louisiana." LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:548(7) (West 1975).
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state commerce under Federal Power Commission price control.15 It
is undesirable for each producing state to try to serve its own purposes
through regulation of natural gas to keep it within the state, but the
solution is not to subject all of it to Federal Power Commission control;
rather, the problem could best be resolved by removing all new natural
gas, and gas under expiring contracts, from federal controls.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that certain of the
consuming states are attempting to hinder efforts to develop additional
energy supplies that would have an impact upon them. Some of the
producing states have for years accepted the burdens and risks of oil
and gas development, including the risks of oil spills affecting coastal
areas. Now they find some consuming states fighting federal efforts
to open new offshore areas for oil and gas development. Most of the
Atlantic seabord states laid claim to ownership of the Atlantic Outer
Continental Shelf far beyond the three miles granted in the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953.'5 The Supreme Court recently cleared the way
for mineral leasing on the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf by denying
those claims.'15
The assertions now being made to delay further the development
of new Outer Shelf areas are based on environmental considerations.
It is well recognized that a state may "burden" interstate commerce if
the state is exercising its power to shelter its people from menaces to
their health or safety.' 59 California and several of the Atlantic states
have claimed that while they cannot stop exploration and production
on federal Outer Continental Shelf lands, they can prohibit, under their
police power, the construction and use of facilities, such as pipelines
and refineries, on state lands that would be necessary for development
to take place on federal lands.6 0 Since the federal government has
comprehensive controls for protection of health and safety from
development activities, it is arguable at least that the state regulation
would be unnecessary and hence an unreasonable and impermissible
restraint on interstate commerce. One might also make an argument
under the supremacy clause of the Constitution that by asserting its
156. See note 49 supra.
157. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970). Texas and Florida were granted three leagues in
the Gulf of Mexico. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States
Y. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
158. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
159. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
160. 6 ENv'T RPT. 1730 (February 6, 1976); OFPSHORB, May, 1975, at 268-69;
[1976] EN. Usnxs RnP. (BNA), No. 154, at C-2.
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authority in this area the federal government has preempted the field
from further state regulation. However, it is to be noted that the states
opposing development could counter this by relying upon the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972161 which gives the coastal states the
right to veto federal issuance of a license or permit to conduct an activ-
ity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone of the state which
would be inconsistent with the state's coastal zone management pro-
gram. The Coastal Zone Management Act will require federal/state
coordination for Outer Continental Shelf development, but the Act
should not be used as a means for coastal states to apply leverage to
obtain from Congress the right to share in the Outer Continental Shelf
lease sale proceeds and subsequent royalties, a right they do not
presently have under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.102 At
present, there are proposals in Congress to amend this Act to give a
share of the federal royalties to the coastal states and to give such states
a greater role in Outer Continental Shelf leasing.163
Over objections by the Department of the Interior and a presiden-
tial veto, Congress, as previously noted, recently enacted extensive
amendments to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 with respect to coal.104
Prior to the amendments, states in which federal coal lands were
located received thirty-seven and one-half percent of the royalties paid
to the federal government for coal produced from within their borders.
Because it was believed that the royalty rate was too low'63 and that
the states involved should receive a greater share of the royalties, the
amendments require a royalty rate of at least twelve and one-half per-
cent of the value of coal' 66 and one-half of this will go to the state in
which the federal coal is located. 167  The effect of these changes will
be to make the coal less desirable for development, increase the cost
of the coal to consumers, and to give the states in which the coal is
located a greater share of money paid for coal which had been owned
by all the people of the United States. It is open to question whether
161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. V 1976).
162. See generally Rubin, The Role of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
in the Development of Oil and Gas from the Outer Continental Shelf, 8 NAT. REs.
LAw. 399 (1975).
163. S. 521, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). H.R. 6218, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
cited in [1976] EN. USERS REP. (BNA), No. 160, at A-19.
164. Act of Aug. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified in scattered
sections of 30, 33 U.S.C.).
165. 122 CoNG. REc. S9980-88 (daily ed. June 21, 1976) (remarks of Senator Met-
calf).
166. 30 U.S.C. § 207(a), cited in [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNe. & AD. NEWS 1087.
167. 30 U.S.C. § 191, cited in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1089.
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the states involved bear so large a burden from coal development as
to justify their receiving one-half of all the benefits from this public
resource. It is possible that congressional representatives from Atlan-
tic seaboard coal consuming states supported the amendment in anticipa-
tion of receiving western state support for amendments to the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to provide for a coastal state share of Outer
Continental Shelf petroleum royalties.
Land reclamation after coal has been strip-mined from federal
lands could also be a source of controversy in instances where the state
has stricter standards for reclamation than has the federal government.
The Department of the Interior has attempted to circumvent this by
providing that where state requirements are as stringent as, or more
stringent than the federal government's, the Interior Department will
adopt the state's requirement for the federal lands within that state.
This is a creative method of avoiding state/federal conflict. Recog-
nizing, however, that national requirements must prevail over local
interests, the Department of the Interior will refuse to apply the state
laws if they "would unreasonably and substantially prevent the mining
of Federal coal" and "it is in the overriding national interest that such
coal be produced without such application of such requirements." '16 8
Energy facility siting is another area that promises to promote con-
flict among organizations and government at the local, state and federal
levels.'6 9  New refineries, new coal-fired electric generating stations,
and new nuclear power plants will have to be built within the United
States. The question is where, and who should determine where, they
will be constructed. Local opposition has successfully killed or sus-
pended efforts to establish such facilities in various parts of the country
as diverse as Seabrook, New Hampshire and southern Utah.170  State
laws may have complex plans for implementing federal air and water
pollution standards, as well as coastal zone planning, that allow new
facilities in few areas, if any. Thus the state of Delaware absolutely
prohibits oil refineries, among other things, from its coastal zone.17 1
168. 30 C.F.R. § 211.75 (1976).
169. See generally Schlauch, Tripartite Federalism-The Emerging Role of Local
Government as a Regulator of the Extractive Industries, 20 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
359 (1975).
170. Wall St. J., October 1, 1976, at 8, col. 4-5 (nuclear plant); [1976] EN. USERS
Rep. (DNA), No. 140, at A-9 (Kaiparowits coal fired generating plant). The Sierra
Club has published a step-by-step guide on how to block projects. J. ROBERTsor &
J. LEWALLE-N, THE GRASs ROOTS PnmsER (1975).
171. DEL. CoDE A.NN. tit. 7, ch. 70, §§ 7002-7003 (1974). It should be noted that
the Coastal Zone Management Act does provide that prior to granting approval to a
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Other states have considered prohibiting nuclear plants within the state.
If each state is able to ban refineries, nuclear plants and the like, it
can prevent entirely the completion of necessary facilities. 1 2
Congress and the courts have been responsible for much of the
conflict that exists with respect to new energy projects and plants. In
amendments to the Clean Air Act73 and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act 174 Congress has specifically granted the right to private
citizens and organizations to bring suit against state and federal agen-
cies for their policy decisions when they are felt to be outside the dis-
cretion of the government officials. This has been virtually an open
invitation to sue. Courts have encouraged such litigation by allowing
any party with a claim of personal injury, however indirect or attenu-
ated, to have standing to bring suit.'73  This has opened wide the doors
of the courts and has led to a plethora of cases; it has allowed courts
to set aside or delay national policy judgments in favor of particularized
or local interests. In other instances, such as the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act discussed previously, and the Deep Water Ports Act, 76
Congress has given state officials veto power over projects.
All of this is not to say that the goals sought to be attained by
particular individuals and groups are not desirable goals or that the
views and interests on the local and state level should be ignored in
setting national policy. What is suggested is that at present there are
too many opportunities for the national interest to be overriden by more
narrow concerns, and for necessary actions to be delayed by private
groups who are ultimately responsible only to themselves. Local inter-
ests must give way to national policy if we are to have a sound and
effective energy policy. The final responsibility for decision-making
on energy policy must be with officials who are accountable to the pub-
lic and who have the broad perspective necessary to make reasonable
state management program, the Secretary of Commerce shall find that "tlhe manage-
ment program provides for adequate consideration of the national interest involved in
the siting of facilities necessary to meet requirements which are other than local in
nature." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (8) (Supp. V 1975). It is to be doubted that this pro-
vides adequate assurance that national interests will prevail over local ones.
172. The question of state efforts to limit the use of nuclear energy has been avoided
by strong voter approval of expansion of use of nuclear power in six states which voted
on citizens' initiatives aimed at imposing tough restrictions on nuclear power. Wall
St. J., Nov. 4, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975).
175. See note 104 supra.
176. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1503 (c) (9), 1508(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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accommodations between energy demand, environmental protection
and other aspects of the public interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are no simple solutions to the energy problems of the
United States. But approaching the problems will be less difficult if
organizing principles may be agreed upon. The foregoing essay has
been an attempt to specify several such principles that could serve as
a guide to future energy policy planning. The economic well-being
and the security of the nation are dependent upon the establishment
of a more workable approach to energy policy. Too much is at stake
for us to continue to follow the inept and counterproductive programs
of the past few years. Until policies can be made consistent with one
another by establishing a consensus upon the basic principles to be fol-
lowed in setting particular policies, we will continue to have an impov-
erished American energy policy.
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